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Paper Multi-threshold signature
Bartosz Nakielski, Jacek Pomykała, and Janusz Andrzej Pomykała
Abstract—The work presents a new signature scheme, called
the multi-threshold signature, which generalizes the concept of
multisignature and threshold signature. This scheme protects
the anonymity of signers in a way the group signature does –
in exceptional circumstances the identities of signers may be
revealed. Due to the new party – completer, in our scheme
the threshold size may vary together with the message to be
signed. The presented scheme is based on the RSA signature
standard, however other signature standards might be applied
to it as well.
Keywords— public key cryptography, threshold signature, mul-
tisignature, secret sharing.
1. Introduction
Threshold and multiparty cryptography represent a wide
and important area of the modern cryptography. The large
part of it deals with the signature schemes such as threshold
signatures and multisignatures.
Threshold signatures (c.f. [3, 9]) allow any group of l users
to create a signature provided l ≥ t (where t is a thresh-
old level, ﬁxed in advance). The multisignature allow any
group of members to sign the given message. The iden-
tities of signers are recognized in the veriﬁcation phase
and then the decision if the signature is accepted is made
(see [1, 4–6]). The veriﬁcation of the signature applies the
public keys of corresponding signers.
This paper is motivated by the following problem: given the
group G of cardinality l and the pair (m,t) we are interested
in the cryptographic scheme that allows any subgroup of
at least t members to sign the message m. In distinction to
the common (t, l)- threshold type scheme, here the value
of t is not ﬁxed in advance, but may vary together with
the message m to be signed. Thus it might be very useful
in applications, where the number of members required to
agree upon the given document depends for instance on the
document’s “priority”.
Another motivation is to propose the ﬂexible signature
scheme, which according to the requirement is anonymous
or admits the signer’s identiﬁcation. This ﬂexibility was not
the subject of the previous papers, which generally speak-
ing treat both solutions in separate schemes (c.f. [2] for
example). From the practical point of view this ability
seems to be signiﬁcant in applications, and the proposed
scheme provides the essential computational savings by
joining both options within one cryptographic scheme.
Therefore as an input for the signing algorithm is the
triple (m,t,b), where b ∈ {0,1} points out if the signature
should be anonymous or with the signer’s identiﬁcation.
The resulting signature is to be veriﬁed by any user apply-
ing the public key related to G. Similarly as in the con-
ventional threshold signature scheme we require, that any
subgroup of cardinality less than t is not able to generate
the valid (i.e., accepted in the veriﬁcation phase) signature,
attached to the pair (m,t) (in fact it is not able to obtain
any nontrivial information about the group G secret value
related to its public key).
In the conventional threshold signature the group public key
corresponds to the given value of the threshold size t. The
idea of our solution relies on the enlarging somewhat the
original group G, so that the public key corresponds to the
bigger threshold size t ′. Then the additional shares (han-
dled by the additional (trusted) party C) will ensure the
valid threshold size t ≤ t ′ of the original signer’s group.
One could extend the above idea considering not necessar-
ily trusted completer (e.g., C being another group of sign-
ers). Such a development in direction of dynamic groups
was considered in [10]. The presented scheme is based on
the RSA [7] cryptosystem, and the Shamir secret sharing
protocol [8]. The paper contains the detailed description
of the corresponding multi-threshold signature scheme and
the proof of its correctness.
2. General system model
2.1. Participants
We assume there are three parties involved in the protocol:
1. Group G = {P1,P2, ...,PK}.
2. The trusted dealer D responsible for the generation
of private and public key of G and the correspond-
ing shares for the group members P1,P2...,PK and
completer C.
3. The trusted completer C responsible for ﬂexibility of
the threshold level.
We assume that the dealer D is connected with the mem-
bers Pi and the completer C by the secure channels. Com-
munication between C and members of G goes through
group message board (GMB) where all the partial signa-
tures are published (only C and G have an access to it).
2.2. Notation
Throughout the paper N is a positive integer such that:
N = pq, where p = 2p′+ 1, q = 2q′+ 1 and p,q, p′,q′ are
prime numbers satisfying min(p′q′) > 2K, where K = |G|.
51
Bartosz Nakielski, Jacek Pomykała, and Janusz Andrzej Pomykała
By λ we denote the Carmichael lambda function deﬁned
as
λ (∏p(pαp) = lcmpλ (pαp), where:
λ (2) = 1 λ (2α) = 2α−2 for α ≥ 3,
λ (4) = 2 λ (pα) = pα−1(p−1) if p is an odd prime
number.
Conventionally the elements e and d are mutually inverse
elements in Z∗λ (N), i.e., ed ≡ 1 mod λ (N).
We assume that every member Pi ∈ G is equipped with the
RSA keys (Ni,ei,di), respectively, needed for the authen-
tication process within corresponding parties or members.
To assure the uniqueness of m′ at the end of the veriﬁcation






(xi− x j) mod λ (N) for i = 1,2, ...,2K
(xi are numbers assigned to Pi).
Moreover we let A′i = Ai/2ϖi , where ϖi is the highest power
of 2 dividing Ai and ϖ = maxi∈I ϖi.
Throughout the paper h will denote a given secure hash
function.
3. Initialization phase
In the initialization phase the dealer D performs the follow-
ing steps:
1. Generates the key pair (d,e) and a random polyno-
mial:
f (x) = d + c1x + c2x2 + ....+ cKxK ∈ Z∗λ (N)[x] .
2. Computes the shares si = f (xi)(A′i)−1 mod λ (N) and
sends them to Pi (i ≤ K) and to C (for K + 1 ≤ i ≤
2K).
Remark 1. Since min(p′,q′) > 2K the odd numbers
A′i are invertible mod λ (N).
3. Selects g∈ Z∗N of order equal to λ (N) and sends g−1
mod N and zi = (gsi)−1 mod N to the completer C.
4. He publishes the group public key gpk = (N,e,ϖ).
4. The anonymous signing phase
Assume that the tuple (m,t,b) (m is the message, t ∈
{1,2, ...,K} is the threshold level and b ∈ {0,1} points out
the signature type (anonymous or with signers identiﬁca-
tion)), is given to G and C in order to be signed by a given
subgroup of G. Then the following steps are performed:
1. Completer’s computation. The completer C com-
putes m∗ = h(m,t,b) and applies the partial signa-
ture generation algorithm to compute and publish in
the GMB the following partial signatures: σit+1(m∗),
σit+2(m
∗), ...,σiK+1(m
∗) (where σi(m∗) = (m∗)si
mod N) together with the sequence it+1, it+2, ..., iK+1
of terms contained in the interval (K,2K].
2. Group signing. The group members who decide to





(1 ≤ i1 < i2 < ... < it ≤ K) in the GMB.
3. Partial signature verification. The completer se-




mod N and sends it to the members participating
in the signature generation. Next he computes
v j = (zi j σi j (m
∗))r mod N. Each member compute
v∗j = (v
∗)s j mod N and sends it to the completer.
Completer accepts the partial signature σi j if and only
if v j = v∗j .
4. Generation of the full signature. With the aid of




∗) allow any del-
egated signer to compute the anonymous signature
((m,t,0),σB(m∗)), where:




∗) mod n and
ai = 2ϖ−ϖi ∏
j∈B
j 6=i
(0− x j) ∏
j/∈B
(xi− x j) is the appropriate
Lagrange coeﬃcient for the group B.
When the signature σB(m∗) (veriﬁed by any signer
using gpk) occurs in the GMB, the anonymous sign-
ing is ﬁnished and σB(m∗) is published.
5. The authorization phase
In the following part the members Pi ∈ B authorize subse-
quently their signature using the private keys di. We remark
that the description of B contains the subscripts of the cor-
responding signers. They perform the following steps:
1. P1 computes the message m′ = h(m∗,σ ,B), signs it
using his private key d1 and sends the obtained ci-
phertext δ1 = (m′)d1 mod N1 to the second mem-
ber P2.
2. P2 veriﬁes if (δ1)e1 ≡m′ mod N1 if so, he computes
δ2 = (δ1)d2 mod N2 and sends it to P3 (otherwise he
publishes in GMB information about this disagree-
ment and stops the protocol).
3. Similarly P3 veriﬁes the obtained ciphertext δ2 using
the public keys (e2,N2) and (e1,N1), respectively,




4. The last member Pt ∈ B veriﬁes δt−1 using the public
keys:
(et−1,Nt−1),(et−2,Nt−2), ...(e1,N1) and, if the veriﬁ-
cation is correct, he computes δt = (δt−1)dt mod Nt
and publishes it in GMB.
5. The full signature of the message m is the 5 – tuple:
((m,t,σ),B,δt ), where Pi ∈ B are ordered as obove.
According to the requirements, the chosen member of the
group G publishes the anonymous signature ((m,t,0),σ)
or the full signature ((m,t,1),σ ,B,δt).
The anonymous signature does not imply any informa-
tion about the identities of the members of B. It proves
only that at least t members of group G have signed the
document m.
6. The veriﬁcation phase
After receiving the anonymous signature (m,t,σ) the ver-
iﬁer uses the group public key (e,N,ϖ) to compute m∗ =
h(m,t,b) mod N and then accepts it provided σ e ≡ (m∗)2ϖ
mod N. To verify the full signature (m,t,σ ,B,δt ) one ﬁrst
computes m′ = h(m∗,σ ,B) and then accepts the full signa-
ture provided (...((δ ett mod Nt)et−1 mod Nt−1)...)e1 ≡ m′
mod N1.
Theorem 1. The correctly created signature will be accepted
in the veriﬁcation phase.
Proof. First let us consider the anonymous signature
(m,t,σ). It is suﬃcient to prove that σ e ≡ (m∗)2
ϖ
mod N.








si = f (xi)(A′i)−1 mod λ (N) , (1)




(xi− x j) . (2)
It remains therefore to show that ∑
i∈B
siai = 2ϖ d = 2ϖ f (0) =
F(0) mod λ (N).
In this connection we apply the Lagrange interpolation for-
mula for
F(x) = 2ϖ f (x) ∈ Z∗λ (N)[x] whose graph passes by the points
(xi1 ,F(xi1)),
(xi2 ,F(xi2)), . . . ,(xiK+1 ,F(xiK+1)), where B = {i1, i2, . . . , it ,
it+1, . . . , iK+1}.
We have F(x) = ∑
i∈B
f (xi)(2ϖ Λi(x)) mod λ (N), where:






















f (xi)(A′i)−1 ·2ϖ−ϖi ∏j∈B, j 6=i(0− x j) ∏j/∈B
(xi− x j) =
= ∑
i∈B
siai mod λ (N), as claimed.
To verify the full signature (m,t,σ ,B,δt ) we use the bijec-
tivity of transformation x 7−→ xdi mod Ni (1 ≤ i ≤ t) and
the inequalities:
N1 < N2 < ... < NK (that assure the uniqueness of m′ at the
end of the veriﬁcation process).
Taking δt to the power et we obtain the unique δt−1
mod Nt−1 then (using et−1) the unique δt−2 mod Nt−2 and
ﬁnally the unique
((m′)d1)e1 = m′ mod N1 as required.

7. Conclusions
Two basic beneﬁts of the presented scheme are the
scaleability (in threshold size) and generality – it might
be useful for the applications typical for the threshold-type
signatures or multisignatures.
The ﬁnal output is the pair: anonymous G-signature and
the full signature (containing the signers’ identiﬁcations).
The completer can be regarded as a well protected machine
which for the input value (m,t,b) outputs the corresponding
partial signatures.
As proved in [10] the multi-threshold device with C re-
garded as another group of signers could be developed in
the direction of dynamic groups signatures schemes.
Appendix – an example
1. System parameters:
p = 23 q = 47 N = 1081 λ (N) = 506
p′= 11 q′= 23 t = 3 min(p′,q′) > 6 = 2t
e = 13 d = 39 m∗ = 7 G = {P1,P2,P3}
2. Dealer generates random polynomial:







(i− j) mod 506
3. We have:
A1 = 386 A′1 = 193 ϖ1 = 1 (A′1)−1 = 409 f (1) = 54
A2 = 24 A′2 = 3 ϖ2 = 3 (A′2)−1 = 169 f (2) = 97
A3 = 494 A′3 = 247 ϖ3 = 1 (A′3)−1 = 295 f (3) = 186
A4 = 12 A′4 = 3 ϖ4 = 2 (A′4)−1 = 169 f (4) = 339
A5 = 482 A′5 = 241 ϖ5 = 1 (A′5)−1 = 21 f (5) = 68
A6 = 120 A′6 = 15 ϖ6 = 3 (A′6)−1 = 135 f (6) = 403
ϖ = maxi ϖi = 3
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4. Dealer, using the table above, computes:
si = f (i)∗ (A′i)−1 mod λ (N)
s1 = (54 ∗ 409) mod 506 = 328
s2 = (97 ∗ 169) mod 506 = 201
s3 = (186 ∗ 295) mod 506 = 222
s4 = (339 ∗ 169) mod 506 = 113
s5 = (68 ∗ 21) mod 506 = 416
s6 = (403 ∗ 135) mod 506 = 263
5. Dealer selects g = 3 and sends to the completer the
following values:
g−1 mod N = 3−1 mod 1081 = 721 and
z1 =(gs1)−1 mod N =331
z2 =(gs2)−1 mod N =259
z3 =(gs3)−1 mod N =639
z4 =(gs4)−1 mod N =949
z5 =(gs5)−1 mod N =538
z6 =(gs6)−1 mod N =647
6. We assume that m∗ = h(m,2,0) = 7
and B = {2,3,4,6}.
7. P2 and P3 generate and send to the completer their
partial signatures:
σ2 = (m∗)s2 mod N = 7201 mod 1081 = 711
σ3 = (m∗)s3 mod N = 7222 mod 1081 = 3
8. Completer veriﬁes partial signatures created by P2
and P3.
He selects r = 5 and sends v∗ to P2 and P3, where
v∗ = (m∗g−1)r mod N = (7 ·721)5 mod 1081 = 732.
Next the completer computes:
v2 =(z2 ·σ2(m
∗))r mod N =(259 ·711)5 mod 1081= 948
v3 =(z3 ·σ3(m∗))r mod N =(639 ·3)5 mod 1081 = 16
9. Members P2 and P3 compute and send to the com-
pleter:
v∗2 = (v
∗)s2 = 732201 mod 1081 = 948
v∗3 = (v
∗)s3 = 732222 mod 1081 = 16
10. Completer accepts σ2, σ3 and creates two missing
partial signatures:
σ4 = (m∗)s4 mod N = 7113 mod 1081 = 964 and
σ6 = (m∗)s6 mod N = 7263 mod 1081 = 79
11. P2 (as a delegated user) computes the interpolation
coeﬃcients:
a2 =21(0−3)(0−4)(0−6)(2−1)(2−5) mod 506=216
a3 =22(0−2)(0−4)(0−6)(3−1)(3−5) mod 506=262
a4 =21(0−2)(0−3)(0−6)(4−1)(4−5) mod 506=216
a6 =20(0−2)(0−3)(0−4)(6−1)(6−5) mod 506=79




(711216 ∗ 3262 ∗ 964216∗ 79386) mod 1081 = 354
12. To verify the signature ((m,1,0),354) we use the
public key (1081,13,3) and compute:
σ e mod N = 35413 mod 1081 = 909
(m∗)2
ϖ
mod N = 78 mod 1081 = 909 and accept the
signature.
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